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VOLUNTARY PLANS WILL NOT CUT GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR

A

by Mary Anne Sullivan*
INTRODUCTION

t the United Nations climate change meetings in
Montreal in December 2005, the U.S. Government
reaffirmed its commitment to a voluntary, technologybased approach to reducing greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.1 The United States stood behind this approach even as
157 parties to the Kyoto Protocol voted to take steps to extend
the Protocol’s mandatory emissions reductions beyond 2012.2
The United States’ faith in a noncompulsory approach comes at
a time when voluntary programs have been struggling. The
power sector is the largest single U.S. contributor to GHG emissions; this article considers the progress that sector has made
with voluntary programs, the structural difficulties it has
encountered, and the prospects of voluntary programs going forward. The picture is not promising.
Announced in 2002, President Bush’s “Climate VISION
Program” seeks to achieve an eighteen percent reduction in carbon intensity across the U.S. economy by 2012 through voluntary actions.3 In December 2004, after almost two years of negotiations, the Administration and the electric power industry
announced “Power Partners.” This agreement commits U.S.
power industry trade associations to work with their members
and the Department of Energy (“DOE”) to reduce the carbon
intensity of the power sector—but only by three to five percent
over ten years.4
If this modest level of emissions reductions is the most to
which the largest contributors to GHG emissions can commit,
the prospects for voluntary emissions reduction programs are
dismal. This is particularly so given that, in a significant and rapidly growing number of states, utilities face mandates to provide
up to twenty percent of their electricity from renewable resources
by 2020. Twenty states and the District of Columbia now impose
a variety of renewable portfolio requirements. Two other states,
Illinois and New Hampshire, have established renewable energy
goals. The renewable resource requirement in Maine is 30 percent, reflecting that state’s abundant supply of hydropower.5
Because electricity generation is such a large source of
GHGs, no program to reduce GHG emissions can succeed without a substantial contribution from the power sector. Yet, as
discussed below, there are important reasons why the power
industry has not more aggressively responded to the issue of
global climate change through voluntary actions. While some of
those reasons may be unique to the power sector, others can be
generalized to other industrial sectors that are major emitters of
GHGs. At the same time, large emitters also increasingly recognize the need to respond meaningfully to the risks of global climate change. Thus, some of the nation’s largest utilities have
47

begun to publicly recognize the need for a mandatory GHG
emissions reduction program. FPL Group, Cinergy, and Exelon
have been among the clearest in their acknowledgement that it
is time for a national program to limit GHG emissions.6

THE HISTORY OF VOLUNTARY UTILITY GHG
REDUCTION EFFORTS

The federal government has been exhorting U.S. utilities to
reduce carbon emissions through voluntary programs for more
than a decade. The predecessor to Power Partners was called
“Climate Challenge.” Begun in 1994, Climate Challenge committed electric power trade associations and DOE to work together on policies to help reduce GHG emissions. Individual utilities
committed to take particular actions to reduce their emissions.7
The agreement came after the United Nation’s Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) but before the
Kyoto Protocol. At the time, voluntary measures were the prevailing approach to addressing climate change internationally.
While the U.S. government had no legal leverage in negotiating
those agreements, many were optimistic that industry would “step
up to the plate and do the right thing.” At that time, the electric
power sector accounted for roughly 35 percent of carbon dioxide
(“CO2”) emissions from energy use in the United States.8
In fact, dozens of utilities undertook projects to reduce GHG
emissions under Climate Challenge agreements. Then, as now,
industry members knew that because they account for such a
large share of total GHG emissions, they would be on the “bleeding edge” of any regulatory initiative. Industry members thus
sought to make the voluntary program a success, and, by some
measures, it has been. Each year since then, Climate Challenge
utilities have undertaken projects that have reduced GHG emissions by hundreds of tons. For several of the last ten years, the
majority of all reporters to DOE’s 1605(b) voluntary registry of
GHG emissions and emissions reductions have been utilities.9
Nevertheless, since 1990, total GHG emissions from the
power sector are up 27.5 percent compared with a 17.6 percent
increase for the economy as a whole.10 Total power generation is
also substantially greater, therefore, the industry’s CO2 intensity
is down, but not by much. Moreover, the decline in carbon intensity is largely a function of the increase over the last decade in
the use of natural gas for power generation, a trend that is now
starting to reverse as a result of increases in natural gas prices.
Notwithstanding the emerging consensus about the need to
reduce GHG emissions, coal – the most CO2 intensive fuel
source – is once again the fuel of choice for the new power gen* Mary Anne Sullivan is a Partner at the law firm of Hogan & Hartson in
Washington, DC. The views in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent those of Hogan & Hartson.
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eration. A recent survey by the National Energy Technology
Laboratory (“NETL”) reported that 129 new coal plants, representing a capacity of 87 gigawatts, may be built over the next
twenty years.11 Allowing that many of these plants probably will
not be built, the emissions from those that do go from the drawing board to operations will swallow up the small progress of
the last decade. With many executives in the power industry certain that the sector’s future will be a carbon-constrained one,
this reliance on coal seems paradoxical. What accounts for this
interest in coal? What does it mean for the future of voluntary
emissions reduction programs?
Four factors provide the answer: (1) the economic regulatory structure of the power industry; (2) the financial struggles of
the competitive sector of the industry; (3) the relatively modest
resources available to the government for incentive programs;
and finally (4) uncertainty about the direction of future public
policy, with respect to both the outcome of the Clean Air Act
“wars” that have stymied the development of policy for tradi-
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tional “criteria pollutants” and to the regulation of GHGs. Taken
together, these four factors will likely mean that Climate
VISION and other voluntary efforts to reduce GHG emissions
in the power sector achieve very little. They also help to explain
the recent bipartisan movement in Congress to mandate a reduction in CO2 emissions. On June 22, 2005, the Senate supported
mandatory limits on greenhouse gases by a vote of 53-44.12

ECONOMIC REGULATION OF THE
POWER INDUSTRY

More than 65 percent of electricity today is generated by
traditional utilities.13 These companies need approval from state
economic regulators both to add to their capacity and to undertake significant improvements in existing physical plants. State
economic regulators are primarily concerned with energy costs
and the utility’s “duty to serve.” Their principal statutory mission is to ensure that the companies they regulate reliably meet
the need for power for all customers in the utility’s service area
at the lowest price to the consumer.
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It is no coincidence that 75 percent of the coal burned to
generate electricity today is used by traditional, cost-of-service
utilities.14 Under most scenarios, coal is the cheapest option.
The coal supply is domestic, plentiful, and highly reliable. It can
be burned in large, baseload plants using proven technology.
To be sure, most utility statutes give their state commissions
authority to address environmental considerations, but those
authorities tend to be quite specific, focusing on demand-side
management, efficiency measures, and, increasingly, renewable
energy mandates. While all of those measures tend to reduce the
GHG emissions of utilities indirectly, utility commissions have
no specific mandate to regulate emissions from power generation
or promote innovative and environmentally promising technologies. Their focus on cost-saving and reliability tends to run
counter to support for reduced carbon emissions technologies (as
with wind, solar, and nuclear technologies). Utilities seeking to
build new facilities have always had to propose plans that comply with all applicable requirements of law, but because environmental protection has typically been accomplished through
mandatory programs, the utility commissions’ emphasis on cost
and reliability over environmental considerations has never been
a matter of much debate. Similarly, when a power plant needs to
upgrade its environmental controls to meet new mandatory standards, there is little room for debate that the expenditure is necessary and that the utility should be able to cover the cost of the
new equipment with a rate hike. When a program is voluntary,
however, it is less clear that associated expenditures are “prudent” and serve the “public convenience and necessity,” the traditional watchwords for assuring cost recovery in rates.
Wisconsin Energy Corporation (“WEC”) offers an interesting case study of the difficulty voluntary efforts face. In need of
significant new baseload capacity, WEC concluded that coal was
the most cost-effective resource. Perhaps because it correctly
anticipated that there would be a public outcry at the prospect of
major new coal plants, WEC devoted considerable effort to evaluating integrated gasification combined cycle (“IGCC”) technology, and it decided to propose that one of the two new plants it
was seeking regulatory approval for should be an IGCC plant.15
IGCC has extremely low emissions of criteria pollutants, along
with lower carbon emissions than other coal burning technologies by virtue of its increased efficiency. Most importantly, however, for purposes of the climate change debate, IGCC lends
itself readily to the addition of carbon capture technology once it
becomes economically and technically feasible.16
There are no baseload IGCC plants operating in the United
States today – just a pair of demonstration projects built during
the 1990s in part with DOE Clean Coal Program funds. Part of
the reason for this is that capital costs are a bit higher for
IGCC,17 and reliability is a bit lower than that of pulverized coal
plants.18 Those two considerations led the Wisconsin Public
Service Commission (“PSC”) to deny the WEC proposal out of
hand, treating the question in a single paragraph of a 72-page
decision, with no mention at all of the potential environmental
benefits IGCC offered.19 Any power generator subject to traditional cost-of-service regulation considering voluntary invest48

ments in GHG-reducing technologies would be wise to consider the implications of the WEC decision.20

COMPETITIVE POWER CONSIDERATIONS

In those industries that have been resistant to voluntary
GHG-reduction efforts, individual companies have blamed their
failure to assume the additional costs of reducing emissions on
competitive pressures; they have no assurance that their direct
competitors in the marketplace will take equivalent steps. That
same argument applies to those electric power companies that
participate in restructured markets, i.e. they sell their power at
market rates in competition with other suppliers. Indeed, the
competitive market for electricity (to the extent it exists today)
was created on the premise that it could provide lower cost
power than the regulated sector. Independent generators may be
able to provide an environmentally superior product, i.e., power
with lower emissions, but at a higher cost. They may then find
it difficult, however, to market their greener (but more expensive) product to their regulated customers in what are often
highly competitive markets. The public utility commissions may
also wonder whether the local utility has made a “prudent,” i.e.
low-cost purchase.
A portion of the independent power sector has very successfully devoted itself to producing renewable energy, which is
increasingly being purchased by utilities to meet their renewable
portfolio requirements. For example, FPL Energy, the deregulated affiliate of the regulated Florida Power & Light, has
become one of the world’s largest producers of wind power.
However, the independent power producers holding themselves
out as providing baseload supply that is dispatchable on demand
most often compete on price alone.21
Competitive power producers also face other barriers to
investing in GHG-reducing technologies. Following the
California electricity crisis, the downfall of Enron, and the sharp
rise in the price of natural gas – the fuel source for most of the
plants the independents have built – independent producers have
faced considerable risk premiums in capital markets. Indeed,
several of the largest competitive power suppliers have undergone bankruptcies or other major reorganizations. Many industry executives have concluded that, in the current business environment, new generating capacity should be built in the economically safer cost-of-service, rate-recovery era.22 Plainly,
those who cannot raise the capital for expansion of their basic
business are unlikely to have funds to invest in significant new
voluntary projects for reductions.

MODEST GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES

As part of its climate change program, DOE has proposed
FutureGen, a coal-fired power plant that would have near zero
emissions, sequester carbon, and produce hydrogen. It is an ambitious vision, and DOE has projected spending one billion dollars a
year over ten years for the development effort.23 That sounds generous, until it is compared to the cost of building a single baseload
plant, which itself could cost in excess of one billion dollars.
Moreover, even the promised federal funding is highly uncertain.24
Although some repudiate new nuclear power plants as an
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inappropriate response to climate change, nuclear power is the
only emissions-free source of baseload generation reasonably
available in the short-term. Regulatory risk and high capital costs
have been the largest perceived stumbling blocks to new nuclear
generation. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct 2005”)25
includes new incentive programs to address those concerns with
the expectation that they will ultimately promote the development of more climate-friendly power generation. Unfortunately,
the incentives are limited and funding is uncertain.
For example, EPAct 2005 authorizes a form of regulatory
risk insurance for up to six new nuclear power plants, covering
certain kinds of delay costs up to $500 million for the first two
plants and up to $250 million for the next four.26 EPAct 2005 also
authorizes federal loan guarantees for innovative power plant
technologies that avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or
GHG emissions.27 Both nuclear power plants based on advanced
reactor designs and IGCC plants are eligible for these loan guarantees. However, absent generous federal appropriations to support the loan guarantees, which seem unlikely, the value of those
guarantees is unclear.28 These new federal incentives are likely

When a program is
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not sufficient to eliminate the concerns about cost and technology
that prompted the Wisconsin PSC to reject IGCC technology.29
The federal government’s principal economic challenge in
this decade is quite likely to be reining in the deficit. Major discretionary spending programs will have to be starved to do that,
and it is unlikely that the government will ever fund incentives
to the utility industry to address climate change at levels sufficient to make a real difference in this sector’s GHG emissions.
The government’s technology research and development investments and incentive programs will hopefully help to point the
way to lower GHG emissions from power generation, but they
will not pay the way.

UNCERTAINTY ABOUT FUTURE POLICY DIRECTION

Delays in resolving the debates under the Clean Air Act and
doubts about the future direction of GHG regulation further
undermine voluntary programs. Whether framed in terms of
“New Source Review” enforcement actions, “Clear Skies” legislation, or the “Clean Air Interstate Rule,” there can be little debate
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

that the Nation’s policy, with respect to traditional pollutant emissions standards for power plants, has been at a stalemate for far
too long. As a result, industry is uncertain what standards it will
be required to meet in the future, new construction is delayed,
and, in the meantime, old, dirty plants are allowed to limp along.
Simply by virtue of improved efficiency, new coal burning plants
should be able to reduce emissions by ten percent or more. While
new plants are being built to meet new demand, those result in
incremental emissions. GHG emissions reductions can only be
achieved when old and inefficient plants are retired.30
In the 1994 Climate Challenge negotiations, utility participants wanted DOE to promise that, whatever voluntary reduction or mitigation actions they took would be credited in the
event of a future mandatory program. Mindful of its lack of
authority to bind any Congress that might, at some distant date,
impose a mandatory GHG emissions reduction program, DOE
demurred. DOE pointed hopefully to the UNFCCC. Its 1990
baseline minimum standard for GHG emissions levels suggested that there was a good chance that participating companies
would get credit for meeting or exceeding these standards
through voluntary actions. Those in the industry who were willing to make real reductions were concerned that they would not
be rewarded for their efforts when it came time to meet subsequent additional mandatory standards.
The same debate was repeated in 2003 and 2004. Indeed,
reaching an agreement on the Power Partners framework was
slowed over that contentious issue. This time around, the concern seems particularly well-founded. There is a growing international consensus that the Kyoto Protocol will have to be modified to bring the United States and large developing countries
into the fold. What shape any new regime for GHG emissions
reduction might take is highly speculative, but it is unlikely to
be based on a 1990 baseline.
As noted above, utility emissions of GHGs have grown by
27.5 percent since 1990. A 1990 baseline is unlikely to be attainable for decades to come, and therefore it is an unlikely choice as
the baseline for any mandatory U.S. program. Indeed, when DOE
proposed enhanced 1605(b) guidelines for GHG emissions
reporting, it limited reportable reductions to those occurring in
2002 or later.31 When the National Commission on Energy Policy
(“NCEP”) recently proposed its framework for GHG reduction
mandates, it called for stabilizing emissions between 2010 and
2019.32 Those who step forward and take bold action now may
well find themselves at a significant disadvantage in meeting any
mandatory standard that is set in the future. In an industry that has
rarely been rewarded for taking risks, this is not an auspicious
environment in which to encourage individual companies to volunteer to “step up to the plate, and do the right thing.”

CONCLUSION

Given all the barriers and the arguments against voluntary
action, it is nevertheless true that there are sound economic reasons for U.S. utilities to begin down the road of significant
emissions reductions. Most obviously, there is a growing consensus that a mandatory program is not far away. Those who
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have found cost-effective ways to reduce emissions will be at an
advantage when that day comes. In addition, when a utility
decides to build a power plant that is expected to serve for 40 or
50 years, prudence would suggest that the utility weigh the likely direction of future policy with respect to climate change, the
opinion of the Wisconsin PSC notwithstanding. Even without a
dictate such as that imposed by the California PUC to assign a
GHG adder to the projected cost of new fossil fuel plants, many
utilities are already doing just that – to ensure that their investments in new generation will stand the test of time.33
There are more immediate pressures as well. Shareholder
resolutions on climate issues have become commonplace at utility company annual meetings, and insurance companies have
spoken out clearly about the risk global warming represents.34
Can shareholder lawsuits and risk premiums in capital markets
be far behind?
A recent court of appeals decision held only that the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) had discretion not to
regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act, not that it lacked the
authority.35 Thus, under a new EPA Administrator, the current
view could be reversed without new legislation. Several utilities
have been forced to defend lawsuits initiated by states and citizens groups premised on the theory that coal-fired generation
represents a public nuisance because of its contribution to global climate change.36 The plaintiffs in those suits had their claims
dismissed, but they have already filed an appeal.37
Two recent articles in Nature suggest that the science and
economics of the impacts of climate change are evolving to the
point where attributing legal blame for extreme climate events
may become feasible.38 One need not agree with these authors
or the plaintiffs in the recent litigation to begin to worry about
the day when a damages lawsuit arising out of global warming
could survive a motion to dismiss. More likely than a judgment,
at least in the near-term, is the potential burden of responding to
multiple class actions. The tobacco litigation is over. The
California electricity crisis lawsuits are beginning to wind
down. Global warming may look like a ripe target to the plaintiffs’ bar, which filed many unsuccessful tobacco lawsuits
before their theories took hold.
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